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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from the District Court's determination that the Idaho Legislature's 
retroactive repeal of Idaho Code §72-9I5 was constitutional. The Appellants (collectively, 
"Dairy Queen") argue that the retroactive repeal was a violation of the Contract Clause 
provisions of the United States and Idaho Constitutions. The District Court disagreed and this 
appeal followed. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
The Idaho State Insurance Fund (collectively, with the other Appellees, "SIF") does not 
identify any additional matters beyond those identified by Dairy Queen. 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts 
I. The Farber litigation. 
Prior to this litigation, a group of Idaho State Insurance Fund policyholders sued the SIF 
contending it was not following I.e. §72-9I5 because it was not paying them a pro rata share of 
dividends declared by the SIF. Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289 
(2009). The SIF disa!:,1Teed, explaining that per the language of I.e. §72-915, the SIF Manager 
had the authority to determine that dividends would not be issued to srF policyholders who paid 
premiums of $2,500 or less during the respective dividend year or who had losses that exceeded 
premIUms m a year. 
The statute at issue in the Farber litigation, which also forms the basis for this action, 
I.e. §72-9I5, stated: 
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At the end of every year, and at such other times as the manager in his discretion may 
determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of the several classes of 
employments or industries. If at any time there is an aggregate balance remaining to 
the credit of any class of employment or industry which the manager deems may be 
safely and properly divided, he may in his discretion, credit to each individual member 
of such class who shall have been a subscriber to the state insurance fund for a period 
of six (6) months or more, prior to the time of such readjustment, such proportion of 
such balance as he is properly entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums 
since the last readjustment of rates. 
The Farber Court held that I.e. § 72-915 was unambiguous and "the distribution of dividends 
must be done on a pro rata basis. ,- farber, 147 Idaho at 311. Notably, the Court recognized the 
Legislature's power to change the law and commented that SIF's arguments were better targeted 
to the Legislature: 
The arguments, evidence, and testimony provided to this Court would be better 
targeted at the Legislature, which is empowered to change existing law .... If, in 
the intervening time, it has become prudent to alter the statutory language related 
to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the proper remedy is to 
approach the Legislature to change the law. 
Id. at 313 (emphasis added). 
2. The repeal of I.e. § 72-915. 
Over eight months before this action was filed, and while the Farber litigation was 
pending before this Court, the Idaho Legislature voted to repeal I.e. §72-915. 1 (R. 242-45.) As 
required by law, the repeal specifically provided that: "An emergency existing therefor, which 
emergency is hereby declared to exist, Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on 
I During the course of drafting the legislation, the bill was taken up at hearing in the Senate 
Commerce and Human Resources Committee on April 7 and April 14, 2009 (R. 186-97.) 
Notably, at the April 7, 2009 hearing on the bill, plaintiffs' counsel in this action - Mr. Gordon 
and Mr. Lojek specifically provided testimony in opposition to the bill. (R. 188-89.) 
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and after passage and approval, and Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect 
retroactively to January 1,2003." (Id. at §3.) The Statement of Purpose accompanying the bill 
recognized that the repeal was necessitated by the decision in Farber: 
Repeal of Idaho Code Section 72-915 will serve to offset an adverse decision of 
the Idaho Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code Section 72-
915 which could subject the State Insurance Fund to pay dividends on policies 
that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the Fund's ability to reduce 
premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. 
(R. 245.) The Legislature further explained that the repeal was necessary to clarify the law 
regarding the payment of dividends by the SIF and that this legislation would allow the SIF to 
operate as an efficient insurance company and "issue dividends in the same manner as other 
insurance companies operating within the State of Idaho." (Id.)2 
The Fiscal Note emphasized the financial uncertainty faced by the SIF and its State and 
private policyholders in light of the Court's ruling: 
The State of Idaho and public entities, which arc insured by the State Insurance 
Fund, face losing all or part of their future dividends and deviations as a result of 
uncertainties as to the effect of a recent Supreme Court decision. Based on 
dividends and rate reduction deviations provided by the State Insurance Fund 
over the past two years, that number could exceed $5,000,000 annually. Private 
businesses may also, due to the same uncertainties, experience the loss of future 
2 Even in the absence of such a legislative statement as to a particular decision by the Idaho 
Supreme Court: "[sJtatutes are construed under the assumption that the legislature was aware of 
all other statutes and legal precedn[tJ at the time the statute was passed." State, ex reI. Wasden 
v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 529, 224 P.3d 1109, 1118 (2010)(quoting Druffel v. State, Dep't of 
Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002»; accord Smith v. Washington County, 150 Idaho 
388,247 P.3d 615, 619 (201O)(stating that "(wJe presume that when it amended §12-117(1), the 
Legislature was aware of the prevailing judicial interpretation of that statute and specifically 
chose to change that interpretation."). 
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(Id.) 
dividends and deviations since, according to the Court's decision, the Fund has 
no option when distributing dividends, other than to use a pro rata formula. 
The Governor signed the repeal on May 6, 2009. (Id.) Thereafter, in Farber, this Court 
denied Respondent's Petition for Rehearing on May 12, 2009, and issued its Remittitur to the 
District Court on May 27, 2009. (Remittitur, Supreme Court Docket No. 35144-2008.) 
3. Summary of this action. 
Over seven months later, on December 24, 2009, Dairy Queen filed a Class Action 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (R. 6-22) that was subsequently amended (R. 23-40). 
Dairy Queen alleged that in violation of I.e. § 72-915, there were policyholders who paid in 
exces~ of $2,500 in annual premiums that did not receive a pro rata share of dividends from 
December 24,2004 on. (R. 30.) 
Recognizing that the repeal of I.e. §72-915 barred the lawsuit, Dairy Queen sought a 
ruling that H[t]hat the rcpeal of I.e. §72-915 by the 2009 legislature be deemed to be 
unconstitutional, void and of no effect as to all policies issued prior to July I, 2009." (R. 37.) 
The District Court disagreed and granted summary judgment to the SIF. (R.357-58.) 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
SIF does not identify any additional issues on appeal. 
[[I. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
SIF only seeks an award of costs should it prevail, pursuant to LA.R. 40. 
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IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As an initial matter, Dairy Queen also sought a declaration that the repeal of I.e. §72-
915 was unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution. Dairy Queen has not disputed the District 
Court's award of summary judgment on that issue and, therefore, it should be affirmed. 
With respect to the Idaho Constitution, the repeal of I.e. §72-915 did not implicate the 
Contract Clause of the Idaho Constitution because dividends are not addressed in the 
policyholders' contract. Therefore, the District Court's dismissal of Dairy Queen's lawsuit 
should be affirmed. 
If the Contract Clause of the Idaho Constitution is relevant, the repeal of I.e. §72-915 
was constitutional based upon an analysis of Idaho and federal law. Dairy Queen asserts that 
the Idaho Constitution's Contract Clause must be read literally and interpreted without reference 
to federal decisional law. This position is unsupported both by this Court's prior reference to 
federal decisional law in considering constitutional questions and by this Court's reco!:,'11ition of 
a police power/public wei fare exception to Idaho's Contract Clause, which echoes the 
considerations in modem Contract Clause analysis. Accordingly, federal law is appropriately 
considered in evaluating the constitutionality of the repeal of I.e. §72-915 under the Idaho 
Constitution. 
As an initial matter, the retroactive nature of the repeal of I.e. §72-915 correctly 
followed Idaho law, expressly stating that such repeal was being made retroactive. 
In analyzing constitutionality, the repeal of I.C. §72-915 is "presumed to be 
constitutional and all reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality must be resolved in favor of its 
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validity." Oneida County Fair Bd. v. Smylie, 86 Idaho 341,346,386 P.2d 374,376 (1963). As 
the challenger to the legislation, Dairy Queen has to overcome this heavy presumption. In 
addition, the test applied in determining whether the repeal violates the Contract Clause is a 
demanding one. Under modem Contract Clause analysis, in order to prevail on their claim that 
the repeal violates the Contract Clause, Dairy Queen must establish that: 
• the state law has, in tact, operated as a substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship; 
• the State does not have a significant and legitimate public purpose 
behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and 
general social or economic problem; and 
• the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting 
parties is not based upon reasonable conditions and is not of a 
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the 
legislation's adoption. 
As a matter of law, Dairy Queen is unable to meet its burden under this test, and 
summary judgment was correctly granted in the SIF's favor. First, the Idaho Legislature has not 
operated a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship because there is no contractual 
right to dividends in the SIF workers' compensation policies, nor any vested or expected right 
therein. In addition, even assuming a right of contract existed, the repeal cannot be considered 
to have substantially impaired it because the purpose of the contract is to provide workers' 
compensation insurance to Idaho's employers and employees. This core function remains 
unchanged by application of the repeal. 
Second, the significant and legitimate public purpose underlying the repeal is evident. 
The SIF and the workers' compensation coverage it provides are creatures of statute. When the 
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Legislature created the SIF, it did not prevent itself from using its police powers to shepherd the 
SIF, a quasi-public entity, and run it efficiently. The repeal merely confonns to the law the way 
the Legislature intended it and the way the SIF has paid dividends for years. Thus, the 
Legislature, recognizing the vitality of the SIF is necessary to the vitality of the public welfare, 
repealed I.e. §72-915 so the Manager would have the authority to make the decisions necessary 
to the economic health and competitiveness of the SIF in today's market. Third, the repeal is 
based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose 
justifying the action. Thus, SIF was appropriately entitled to summary judgment because there 
was no tactual question that prevented the District Court from detennining that, as a matter of 
law, Dairy Queen failed to meet its heavy burden of showing that the repeal of I.e. §72-915 was 
unconsti tutional. 
Additionally, it IS inappropriate for Dairy Queen to ask this Court to rule that the 
Legislature had no basis to enact the repeal as emergency legislation because the Idaho Supreme 
Court has previously held that the Legislature's decision to declare an emergency is exclusively 
within the legislature's authority and will not be second-guessed by the judiciary. 
As a final matter, Dairy Queen's attempt to reserve additional factual and legal disputes 
on appeal, without specification of the precise nature of the alleged errors, is insufficient for 
purposes of appeal, and this Court should deem all such arguments waived. 
For these reasons, the District Court's decision should be affinned. 
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V. STANDARD OF REVIE\V 
"Both constitutional questions and questions of statutory interpretation are questions of 
law over which this Court exercises free review." Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35,40, 232 P.3d 
813,818 (2010); accord, V-I Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 134 Idaho 716, 718, 9 P.3d 
519, 521 (2000) (holding that ''[b ]ecause constitutional questions are purely questions of law, 
they are also reviewed de novo."). 
Despite the free review/de novo standard for questions of constitutionality, legislative 
acts are presumed to be constitutional: "[a] legislative act is presumed to be constitutional and 
all reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality must be resolved in favor of its validity." Oneida 
Countv Fair Ed. v. Smylie, 86 Idaho at 346. The burden of proving that a legislative act rests 
squarely on the challenger: 
There is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the challenged statute 
or regulation, and the burden of establishing that the statute or regulation is 
unconstitutional rests upon the challengers. An appellate court is obligated 
to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds it (sic) constitutionality. 
The judicial power to declare legislative action unconstitutional should be 
exercised only in clear cases. 
Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho at 40 (quoting Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2 v. Idaho Dep't of 
Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 154 P.3d 443 (2007)) (emphases added). 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. Dairv Queen does not contest the District Court's ruling regarding the U.S. 
Constitution and, therefore, the dismissal of that claim should be affirmed. 
On summary judgment, the District Court held the following: "THE COURT HEREBY 
FINDS that the Legislature's retroactive repeal of I.e. §72-915 is constitutional under the 
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United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution." (R. 358) (emphasis added). Dairy 
Queen did not appeal the District Court's decision as it pertained to the United States 
Constitution. Therefore, the District Court's finding that the retroactive repeal of I.e. §72-915 is 
constitutional under the United States Constitution should be affirmed. 
B. Idaho's Contract Clause is not implicated because Dairy Queen had no contractual 
right to dividends. 
There is no contractual right to a dividend under an SIF workers' compensation policy. 
Therefore, the Contract Clause is not implicated and the summary judgment in the SIF's favor 
should be affirmed. 
The contract of insurance SIF policyholders receive sets forth the parameters of the 
workers' compensation coverage. (R. 74-79.) It does not provide for the payment of a dividend 
to the policyholders. In tact, nowhere does it even address dividends. Accordingly, Dairy 
Queen's dividend claim is not a term of the insurance policy and, therefore, no provision in the 
SIF policies is impacted by the repeal of I.e. §72-915. 
In an attempt to avoid the inescapable tact that dividends are not mentioned in any way, 
shape, or form in each SIF policyholder's contract for insurance, Dairy Queen generally points 
to Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, III P.3d 73 (2005), Kelso v. 
State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130,997 P.2d 591 (2000), and Straus v. Ketchum, 54 Idaho 56, 
28 P.2d 824 (1933) for the premise that "the terms and conditions of the contracts between the 
SIF and its policyholders included not only the provisions of its written policy but also the 
Idaho statutes creating and governing the SIF which were in force at the time the contract was 
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entered into." (Appellants' Brief at 13.) This argument If,TflOreS the nature of the SIF, its 
goveming statutes, and the SIF policies themselves. 
The SIF is an ""independent body corporate politic," and, thus, a quasi-public entity that 
is created by, and exists by, a statutory grant of authority. See generally, I.e. §72-901 et seq.; 
Kelso, 134 Idaho at 136 (holding that the SIF is not a private insurance company). While 
"SIF's statutory provisions are necessarily part of [the insured's] contract with SIF," Kelso, 134 
Idaho at 140, the contract of insurance does not provide for the payment of a dividend to the 
policyholders - in fact, nowhere does it even address dividends, nor does the Kelso decision 
make any such finding. 
Further, the goveming statutes for the SIF do not guarantee payments of dividends to 
policyholders, nor do they set forth that the policyholders have a property interest in the surplus 
or assets of the SIF. See I.e. §72-901 ct seq. Notably, this Court previously concluded the 
SIF's statutory framework does not create any property rights in the SIF's policyholders. 
Kelso, 134 Idaho at 135 (holding that "Kelso does not have [a] vested property interest in the 
assets of the SIF simply because the SIF operates much like a private mutual insurance 
company."). As such, an SIF policyholder has no vested right in the surplus and assets of the 
SIF and there is no right to a dividend. 
Because there is no contractual right to a dividend, the Idaho Contract Clause IS 
inapplicable and the District Court's dismissal of Dairy Queen's case should be affirmed. 
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C. If Idaho's Contract Clause is implicated, the Court may appropriately consider 
federal case law in evaluating its requirements. 
Dairy Queen contends that "federal decisional law is completely irrelevant to the 
resolution of this matter." (Appellants' Brief at 19).3 Dairy Queen's position is unsupportable 
given that this Court has held that "we seriously consider federal law in detennining the 
parameters of our own constitutional provisions, and we may adopt federal precedent under the 
state constitution but only to the extent that we believe the federal law is not inconsistent with 
the protections afforded by our state constitution." State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988, 842 
P.2d 660, 667 (1992).4 
With respect to the Contract Clause specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court has not been 
persuaded that federal law is inconsistent with the Idaho Constitution. To the contrary, the 
Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed a federal and state constitutional argument with a 
single, dispositive analysis that relied on the application of federal case law. See State v. Korn, 
148 Idaho 413,224 P.3d 480,482 (2009). In Korn, the defendant argued that a city violated his 
3 This is not surprising given that Dairy Queen has not challenged the District Court's ruling as 
to the constitutionality of the repeal of I.e. §72-915 under the U.S. Constitution, the modern 
Contract Clause analysis for which eviscerates Dairy Queen's claims in this action. 
4 Dairy Queen cites State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 16 n.6, 696 P.2d 856, 867 n.6 (1985) for the 
proposition that Idaho courts no longer "blindly apply United States Supreme Court 
interpretation and methodology" in interpreting state constitutions; however, in doing so, Dairy 
Queen fails to acknowledge this Court's remark that while defendants "did not also argue that 
the due process clause of Art. I, § 13 of Idaho's Constitution invalidates the Act in question, 
had they done so, we do not think that the result would have been different, for we are 
convinced that the rules we set down for facial challenges to the constitutionality of a statute, 
although deri ved from federal sources, are also sound and proper under Idaho's Constitution." 
/d. 
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rights under "the contract clauses found in the Idaho and u.s. constitutions." 148 Idaho at 415. 
The Korn Court, without making a distinction between the two constitutions, engaged in a 
single analysis, relying on federal case law (Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 
234, 241 (1978)) to hold that the city's ordinance did not violate his rights under either 
constitution. rd. at 483. 
Ignoring Korn and instead triumphing the Guzman case as an example of this Court's 
departure from u.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the federal Constitution (specifically, 
Fourth Amendment protections), Dairy Queen fails to note that this Court later refused to 
further expand Guzman, instead opting to adopt the u.S. Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment 
rationale in evaluating search and seizure protections for garbage. State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 
469, 20 P.3d 5 (2001). In doing so, this Court explained that Guzman was the result of "the 
uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence," as well as "an 
independent exclusionary rule based on the state constitution that had developed over sixty-five 
years:' Id. at 472. 
There is no case law in Idaho establishing any "independent" rule with respect to the 
Contract Clause and, as noted above, the Korn court looked to federal law in disposing of a 
Contract Clause argument. 148 Idaho at 415-16 (citing Allied Structural, supra). Similarly, in 
Lindstrom v. District Bd. of Health Panhandle, 109 Idaho 956, 961, 712 P.2d 657,662 (Ct. App. 
1985), the Court of Appeals, citing to Allied Structural, summarily rejected a Contract Clause 
challenge without identifying any different analysis between the U.S. and Idaho constitutions. 
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Accordingly, Dairy Queen's argument that federal decisional law IS "completely 
irrelevant" should be disregarded by this Court. 
D. Idaho's Contract Clause does not mandate a literal reading, nor does modern 
Contract Clause analysis approve of such. 
Dairy Queen next asserts that the Idaho Constitution's Contract Clause is to be 
interpreted differently than the U.S. Constitution, given slightly different language used in both 
clauses.5 In doing so, Dairy Queen takes the absolutist position that '" [e]ver', one must think, 
means never, not 'sometimes' or 'on occasion'[.]" (Appellants' Brief at 22.) The result, Dairy 
Queen contends, is that Idaho's constitution is "intended to provide the contracts formed by 
Idaho citizens with absolute protection." (Appellants' Brief at 21.) If that is the case, then a 
review of Idaho Supreme Court case law will illustrate that the Court has rejected every law that 
impaired any contractual right. Such is not the case. 
Take first the Kom decision. In Kom, the Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Allied Structural when it stated that "[t]he ... contracts clause protects only those 
contractual obligations already in existence at the time the disputed law is enacted." 148 Idaho 
at 415-16.6 Tellingly absent from the Kom decision (and Lindstrom, supra) was any discussion 
5 Compare Article I, § 10, U.S. Constitution ("No state shall ... pass any ... law impairing the 
obligation of contracts.") with Article 1, § 16, Idaho Constitution ("No ... law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall ever be passed."). 
6 The Allied Structural Court rejected the literal reading of the Contract Clause that Dairy 
Queen seeks to employ on appeal: "The Clause is not, however, the Draconian provision that its 
words might seem to imply. As the Court has recognized, 'literalism in the construction of the 
contract clause ... would make it destructive of the public interest by depriving the State of its 
prerogative of self-protection." 438 U.S. at 240. 
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of how a Contract Clause claim would be treated differently under the Idaho Constitution than 
under the u.s. Constitution. Also missing was any statement by the Court that Allied 
Structural's modem contract clause analysis (and appurtenant non-literal reading of the Contract 
Clause) was inapplicable when interpreting the Idaho Constitution. 
Dairy Queen's argument for a literal reading of the Contract Clause also fails given this 
Court's prior recognition of the police power exception to the Contract Clause. See Agricultural 
Products Corp. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 98 Idaho 23, 557 P.2d 617 (1976) (holding that the 
state may exercise its police power to modify contracts related to public utilities if it is in the 
public interest). Similar to the question posed in Agricultural Products, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals considered the question of whether ordinances could impose fees upon existing 
franchises in the later decision of City of Hayden v. Washington Water Power Co., 108 Idaho 
467,700 P.2d 89 (CL App. 1985). There, while rejecting the particular fees at issue, the Court 
took pains to indicate that the State had the authority to act pursuant to its police power, even if 
it impacted existing contracts. Id. at 469. Thus, the police power exception to the constitutional 
proscription against impairing contracts could be considered for those acts "promoting the 
health, comfort, safety and general welfare of society." Id. at 468. 
Further, in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993), this Court reviewed the 
authority of the Idaho Industrial Commission to cap attomeys fees at 25% via a "letter of 
understanding." The Court's primary basis for rejection was the Commission's failure to abide 
by the Administrative Procedures Act. Id. at 691. Notably, the Court did not take the absolutist 
view that because the 'letter of understanding' impaired fee agreements, it was per se 
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unconstitutional; rather, the Court focused on the Commission's lack of procedure in 
promulgating the 'letter of understanding': "In order to justifiably modify attorney fee 
agreements in the interest of public welfare, the Commission must afford due process to the 
contracting parties, i.e., notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time." Id. 
(emphasis added). Thus, the Court's criticism was not with the right to modify the agreements, 
but simply the procedure in which it was done. 
Even the 1954 Penrose decision (Dairy Queen's touchstone case in this litigation) was 
reeled in by later decisions - decisions that are unaddressed by Dairy Queen. (Appellants' Brief 
at 18, n. 6). These decisions clarified that retroactive legislation, even as applied to existing 
contracts, is not per se unconstitutional. In Eriksen v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health Services, 
Inc., the Idaho Court of Appeals clari fied that "[b ]ecause the statute shifted the balance of 
power between contracting parties, by identifying a favored party in the event of litigation, the 
Supreme Court barred its application to pre-existing contracts." 116 Idaho 693, 696, 778 P.2d 
815, 818 (CI:. App. 1989). Thus, the Eriksen Court appears to have narrowed Penrose to 
scenarios where a statutory change would have "affected bargaining relationships by 
designating favored parties," characterizing the Penrose decision as resting upon a "policy 
rationale." Id. This explanation by the Idaho Court of Appeals was later confinued by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Authority, 122 Idaho 471, 835 P.2d 1282 
( 1992). 
As discussed below in Section F(2) (c), however, the repeal of I.e. §72-915 did not 
impact the "bargaining relationships" between the parties, but rather maintained the status quo 
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of dividend practices in accord with the Idaho Legislature's intent. Further, the policy needs of 
the repeal of I.e. §72-915, outlined below in Section F(3), were not at issue in Penrose and, 
applied here, demonstrate that the repeal complies with the Contract Clause. 
The absolutist view Dairy Queen advocates has also long been rejected by the U.S. 
Supreme Court with respect to the U.S. Constitution's Contract Clause. See, e.g., Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 503, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1251 (1987) 
(stating that "it is well settled that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts is 
not to be read literally."). Even Washington State's Contract Clause, which differs from 
Idaho's by only a single letter and which also utilizes the word "ever," is not construed literally. 
See, ~ Optimer Intern., Inc. v. RP Bellevue, LLC, 214 P.3d 954, 958-59 and n.lO (Wash. 
App. 2009) (explaining that "'the prohibition against any impairment of contracts is not an 
absolute one and is not be read with literal exactness.' The 'prohibition must be accommodated 
to the inherent police power of the State to safeguard the vital interests of its people.' ... These 
parallel provisions [of the U.S. and Washington State Constitutions] are substantially similar 
and are interpreted as having the same effect. In light of this similarity, we may rely on cases 
construing the federal constitutional provision as persuasive authority in construing the 
Washington constitutional provision.") (internal citations omitted). 7 
7 Compare Article 1, § 16, Idaho Constitution ("No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed.") with Article I, §23, Washington 
State Constitution ("No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of 
contracts shall ever be passed. "). 
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Accordingly, Dairy Queen's argument on appeal that Idaho has made an absolutist 
interpretation of the Idaho Constitution's Contract Clause and that reference to federal decision 
law is "irrelevant" is unsupported. As discussed below, then, application of modem Contract 
Clause analysis is appropriate, and fully supports the ruling of the District Court in this matter. 
E. The retroactive component of the repeal of I.e. §72-915 followed Idaho law. 
As an initial matter, Idaho Code §73-1 0 1 provides that "No part of these compiled laws 
is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." The Idaho Supreme Court has confirmed that "a 
statute will be applied retroactively where there is a clear legislative intent to that effect." 
Union Warehouse and Supply Co., Inc. v. Illinois R.B. Jones, Inc., 128 Idaho 660, 669, 917 
P.2d 1300, 1309 (1996). In repealing I.e. §72-915, the Idaho Legislature was clear on the intent 
to make the legislation retroactive, stating in Section 3 of the repeal: 
An emergency existing therefore, which emergency is hereby declared to exist, 
Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after passage and 
approval, and Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect retroactively to 
January 1,2003. 
Accordingly, the retroactive component of the repeal of I.e. §72-915 followed Idaho law. 
F. Based on the Modern Contract clause analysis, the retroactive repeal of I.e. §72-
915 was constitutional. 
1. The Modem Contract Clause analysis. 
Whether there is a violation of the Contract Clause requires a three-step analysis: (1) 
"whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship[;]" (2) "whether the State ... [has] a significant and legitimate public purpose 
behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic 
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problem[;]" and (3) "whether the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting 
parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public 
purpose justifying the legislation's adoption." RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 
1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
In Los Quatros, Inc. v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 800 P .2d 184 (1990), the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico outlined the modem parameters of the test for whether the legislation 
violates the Contract Clause once it has been established there is indeed a contractual 
relationship. In Los Quatros, a mortgagor sued for declaratory judb'l11ent that a law allowing for 
early payment applied to its mortgage, despite the contract's language to the contrary. The 
mortgagee relied on Von Hoffinan v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 18 L.Ed. 403 
(1866), for the proposition that states cannot -constitutionally reduce a party's existing rights 
under a contract; however, the Quatros court pointed out that "much water has flowed over the 
dam since Von Hoffman, and so we prefer to apply more modem Contract Clause analysis in 
deciding whether or not to invalidate this statute in this case." Quatros, 800 P .2d at 192. 
The Quatros court went on to explain that different Contract Clause cases had different 
factors present but found these cases to be nevertheless applicable: 
Perhaps the case providing the best overview of the appropriate methodology is 
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Palver & Light Co., [459 U.S. 400 
(1983)]. There the Court reviewed a Kansas statute regUlating the price of natural 
gas sold intrastate between a producer and a public utility, and held that it was 
not invalid under the Contract Clause. The Court noted, first, that "[t]he 
threshold inquiry is 'whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial 
impairment of a contractual relationship. '" It went on to say that "[t]he severity 
ofthe impairment is said to increase the level of scrutiny to which the legislation 
will be subjected," or "the height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear." 
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In detennining the extent of the impainnent, it is relevant that the industry which 
the complaining party has entered has or has not been regulated in the past. 
If the answer to the threshold inquiry is that the state regulation does indeed 
constitute a substantial impainnent, the state "must have a significant and 
legitimate public purpose behind the regulation;' so that there is some guarantee 
that the state "is exercising its police power, rather than providing a benefit to 
special interests." Finally, once a legitimate public purpose has been identified, 
the reviewing court must detennine "whether the adjustment of 'the rights and 
responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions and 
[is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation's] 
adoption. '" 
Quatros, 800 P .2d at 192 (citations omitted). 
The Quatros court allowed the legislation to stand because it did not effect the 
underlying debt and because the banking industry is highly regulated, thus the impainnent was 
slight. Despite finding the impainnent was slight, the court still found it necessary to evaluate 
the public purpose. The court concluded that promoting the alienability of land was a public 
purpose, and that the legislation was appropriately tailored to that end. Id.; accord Allied 
Structural, 438 U.S. at 244-45 (stating that "[i]n applying these principles to the present case, 
the first inquiry must be whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impainnent 
of a contractual relationship. The severity of the impainnent measures the height of the hurdle 
the state legislation must clear. Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the 
inquiry at its first stage. Severe impainnent, on the other hand, will push the inquiry to a careful 
examination of the nature and purpose of the state legislation."). 
The following is an application of modem contract clause analysis to the instant case. 
As discussed below, and again bearing in mind that "[a] legislative act is presumed to be 
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constitutional and all reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality must be resolved in favor of its 
validity," Oneida County Fair Bd. v. Smylie, 86 Idaho at 346, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that 
the repeal of I.e. §72-915 was unconstitutional. 
2. Threshold Inquiry: The Idaho Legislature has not operated a substantial 
impairment of a contractual relationship. 
In analyzing a claim that the Contract Clause has been violated, "[t]he threshold inquiry 
IS 'whether the state has, in fact, operated a substantial impairnlent of a contractual 
relationship." RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d at 1147; accord. Quatros, 800 P.2d 
at 192. "The threshold inquiry ... itself has three components: 'whether there is a contractual 
relationship, whether a change in law impairs that contractual relationship, and whether the 
impairment is substantial." Id. 
a. There is no contractual right to a dividend. 
As discussed above in Section VI(B), Dairy Queen cannot prevail on this threshold 
question because dividends are not covered by the SIF policies. In fact, the SIF contract of 
insurance does not provide for or even address in any way, shape, or form the payment of a 
dividend to the policyholders. There is simply no contractual right to a dividend under the SIF 
workers' compensation policy. 
In addition, as addressed above on pages 9-10, the governing statutes for the SIF do not 
guarantee payments of dividends to policyholders, nor do they set forth that the policyholders 
have a property interest in the surplus or assets of the SIF. See I.e. §72-90l et seq. An SIF 
policyholder has no vested right in the surplus and assets of the SIF; rather, the assets and 
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surplus belong to the SIF in order to meet its statutory purpose as provided in I.e. §72-90 I (l). 
Kelso, 134 Idaho at 135.8 
Dairy Queen's argument, then, is necessarily predicated on the presumption that the 
Legislature is powerless to make policy changes in the law that Dairy Queen contends is the 
sole source of its "contract" for dividends. This argument has been rejected by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
470 U.S. 451, 105 S.Ct. 1441 (1985), Congress passed statutes relieving railroads of providing 
rail service to inter-city passengers; then later amended the statutes to require railroads to pay 
Amtrak for transporting its employees. In tum, the railroads sued, alleging that the amendment 
was unconstitutional under the Contract clause; the U.S. intervened on the side of Amtrak. The 
National R.R. Court explained that a presumption exists that it if; the primary function of the 
legislature to make laws that establish the policy of the state and not to make contracts: 
Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and repeal, and to 
construe laws as contracts when the obligation is not clearly and unequivocally 
expressed would be to limit drastically the essential powers of a legislative body. 
Indeed, "'[t]he continued existence of a government would be of no great value, 
if by implications and presumptions, it was disarmed of the powers necessary to 
accomplish the ends of its creation. '" Thus, the party asserting the creation of a 
contract must overcome this well-founded presumption and we proceed 
8 Even ifone assumes for sake of argument that I.e. §72-915 is incorporated into each contract 
for insurance with the SIF, the SIF policy itself caveats that it is subject to statutory change: 
"Terms of this insurance that conflict with the workers compensation law are changed by this 
statement to conform to this law." (R. 75.) Thus, if that is the case, an SIF policyholder is on 
notice from the commencement of coverage that the terms of the policy are governed by 
statutes, and are subject to amendment at any time by a change in the law. The repeal of LC. 
§ 72-915 then would be automatically incorporated into the policy, and no impainnent of 
contract would exist. 
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cautiously both in identifying a contract within the language of a regulatory 
statute and in defining the contours of any contractual obligation. 
National R.R., 470 U.S. at 465-67. 
Here, the Idaho Legislature opted to simply abandon any policy that mandated a 
particular dividend methodology by repealing the statute that a) provided no guarantee of 
dividends and b) according to the Farber Court provided the only basis to claim a particular 
dividend methodology. 
In sholi, the SIF policy and the SIF statutes have promised nothing that Dairy Queen has 
not received, and Dairy Queen can cite no specific impairment of an express or promised 
contractual provision; as such, no Contract Clause question is implicated. The District Court's 
award of summary judgment should be affirmed. 
b. There is no vested or expected right to a dividend. 
Although Dairy Queen's argument suggests that the dividend methodology under I.c. 
§72-915 constituted a "material vested right" (Appellants' Brief at 14), at summary judgment, 
Dairy Queen offered no factual evidence regarding past dividend practices that might give rise 
to a claim of a "vested" right. It is well established that "an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for triaL" LR.C.P. 56( e). As such, Dairy Queen failed to come forward with any evidence 
of a party making a claim for a "vested" right. In addition, Idaho generally precludes insureds 
from claiming a "reasonable expectation" of some term not expressly provided for in their 
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policy of insurance. See generally Ryals v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 134 Idaho 302, 304, 
1 P. 3d 803, 805 (2000). Therefore, Dairy Queen's argument of a "vested right" fails. 
Nevertheless, even if this argument is considered, Dairy Queen cannot paint an expected 
or vested right to a strict pro rata dividend distribution because SIF dividends have not 
previously been paid that way. See, ~ Farber, 147 Idaho at 310 (discussing payment 
methodologies from 1982 to present). Moreover, any change in the interpretation of I.e. §72-
915 created by Farber was promptly remedied by the Idaho legislature before remittitur issued. 
See Southwestern Bell TeL Co. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, 615 S.W.2d 947,956-57 
(Texas Civ. App. 1981) (finding that "[i]n deternlining whether a retroactive statute impairs or 
destroys vested rights, the most important inquiries are (I) whether the public interest is 
advanced or retarded, (2) whether the retroactive provision gives effect to or defeats the bona 
fide intentions or reasonable expectations of affected persons, and (3) whether the statute 
surprises persons who have long relied on a contrary state of the law."). 
In the present case, the SIF, for decades prior to this instant litigation, employed a 
dividend methodology other than that which this Court mandated in Farber. See Farber, 147 
Idaho at 310 (noting testimony that, from 1982 until 2003, "large policyholders were paid a 
larger percentage dividend than small policyholders," and from 2003 on, the dividend was 
calculated "by splitting the entire surplus between those few policyholders who paid more than 
$2,500.00 in annual premiums to the Fund."). The Farber decision then announced an 
--
interpretation of I.e. §72-915 that the Legislature itself did not intend for the statute, as borne 
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out by S.B. 1 166a's Statement of Purpose. 9 Indeed, even before the Idaho Supreme Court's 
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing (May 12, 2009) and subsequent Remittitur (May 27, 
2009), the repeal of I.e. §72-915 was put into effect by virtue of the Governor's signature on 
May 6, 2009. 
Thus, even after the initial Farber decision, no expectation in pro rata distribution of 
declared dividends could reasonably have been contemplated by SIF policyholders given that 
I.e. §72-915 was repealed even before the Farber appeal was completed before this Court. 
Thus, here, an SIF policyholder could have only reasonably expected to receive dividends in pro 
rata fashion after the Farber decision - and even then, the law was immediately changed by the 
Idaho legislature before remittitur ever issued. 
Such analysis is supported by case law addressing similar issues. See Boykin v. Boeing 
Co., 128 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the retroactive application of the Senate 
Bill did not defeat any reasonable expectation of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit because the 
employees had not changed their position and the employees could not have a reasonable 
expectation for a different outcome); In Re Marriage of Giroux, 704 P.2d 160, 162-163 (Wash. 
App. 1985) (rejecting an argument that the husband in a divorce proceeding had no reasonable 
expectation that his military pension would not be treated as community property). 
9 It is also significant to point out that since the major statutory amendments of 1998, the SIF 
has been squarely under the regulatory authority of the Department ofInsurance, and is deemed, 
for the purposes of regulation, a mutual insurer. See I.C. § 72-901. Since 1998, however, the 
SIF has never been subject to any regulatory action by the Department ofInsurance related to its 
dividend practices. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 24 
c. The SIF policies were not "substantially impaired." 
It IS well established that "[t ]he Contracts Clause provides protection against 
'substantial' impainnents of the obligation of contract only. A finding of minimal alteration of 
contractual obligations may end the court's inquiry." 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 
776 (2010). 
The overriding purpose of workers' compensation policies issued by the SIF is not to 
potentially allow a fractional return on paid premiums. Instead, the core, fundamental function 
and purpose of worker's compensation coverage is to provide unlimited coverage for covered 
worker injuries (and, under Part 2, additional coverage for covered employer liability in an 
amount contracted by the policyholder) to its policyholder regardless of the premium size. 
Thus, the SIF policy provides a policyholder paying $300 a year in premiums the same 
coverage as a policyholder paying annual premiums of $500,000. The repeal of I.e. §72-915 
did not alter, in any way, the coverage for workers' compensation claims. Altering the way the 
SIF Manager pays out dividends to particular policyholders, then, does not constitute a 
"substantial" impainnent to the parties' contract of insurance. 
Moreover, Dairy Queen cannot demonstrate that the repeal effectuated a "substantial 
impainnent" on the insurance polices between the SIF and the policyholders based upon the 
limitations of their own Amended Complaint Dairy Queen does not, and cannot, contend that 
their claims in this action are applicable to all policyholders paying in excess of $2,500 in 
premiums for the years at issue. In years where SIF elected to not distribute dividends to those 
policyholders below a certain paid premium level ($2,500, as was the subject of the Farber 
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action), the dividends declared were, instead, redirected to policyholders of more than $2,500 in 
premiums. Thus, certain of those larger policyholders received dividends that were larger than 
what their pro rata share would have been under I.e. §72-915. In fact, Dairy Queen's own 
complaint seeks to exclude those same certain policyholders from this action. (R. 30-31, ~15.) 
Therefore, Dairy Queen's efforts to nullify the repeal of I.e. §72-915 is not predicated on the 
claim that all policyholders' rights were "impaired" by the repeal, but only that certain 
policyholders' rights were impaired. 
In addition, a review of Idaho authority cited by Dairy Queen discussing impairment of 
contracts actually highlights the need for a "substantial" impainnent, a key element for which 
Dairy Queen cannot demonstrate in its own case. For example, in Steward v. Nelson, 54 Idaho 
437,32 P.2d 843 (1934), the issue presented to the Court was the impact of two statutes passed . 
by the Idaho legislature that deprived the plaintiff mortgage-holders of the right to foreclose on 
already agreed-to mortgages after a certain period of time. The Court found that the law 
effectively obliterated the intent of the mortgage. 32 P.2d at 845 and 847. In the present case, 
however, as discussed above, there has been no 'substantial' impairment by virtue of the repeal 
of I.e. §72-915. 
Similarly, In Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850 P.2d 749 (1993), the legislature 
amended a law, which amendment would effectively eviscerate the right to act on a note 
secured by a deed of trust. The Court concluded the amendment was not constitutional because 
the remedies available to note-holders at the time they entered into a note were erased by the 
amendment. As such, the situations in Steward and Curtis are distinguishable from this case -
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the laws in those cases significantly impaired the purpose of existing contracts, where in this 
case the purpose of the contracts remained untouched. 
Apparently recognizing this problem, Dairy Queen instead asserts that the dividend 
should be considered to be "consideration" for the Policy, and, thus, a substantial impairment. 
(Appellants' Brief at 14.) There is not a single affidavit from any of the complaining plaintiffs 
that the Policies were purchased for that reason. In addition, such argument ignores the true 
"consideration" exchanged by the parties: payment of premium in exchange for unlimited 
workers' compensation coverage on covered claims. 
Dairy Queen goes on to point to the "agb'Tegate amount at issue" as being $24 million, 
and thus "substantial." First, this argument again ignores the reason for the insurance contracts: 
workers' compensation coverage. Second, this figure ignores that not all policyholders paying 
premiums greater than $2,500 are benefited from the arguments Dairy Queen makes in this case 
because some of them received greater than a pro rata dividend. Third, this figure was offered 
in testimony in relation to the Farber decision and included issues of potential other similar 
Farber judgments. Lastly, Dairy Queen did not bring their claim until at least eight months after 
this legislative hearing and, therefore, this was not a comment solely limited to this case. (R. 
188.) 
Again ignoring the purpose of the SIF insurance policies and the discretion the SIF 
Manager has with respect to when to declare a dividend and how much will be declared 
(Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcom, 141 Idaho at 392, III P.3d at 77), Dairy Queen offers 
a hypothetical impact of the repeal of I.e. §72-915 on Discovery Center. Specifically, Dairy 
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Queen proposes an unsubstantiated dividend average of 7.6% 10 for the three-year period I I 
between July I, 2004 to June 30, 2007 policy issuances. Using this rate, Dairy Queen yields a 
three-year total of $18,000.00 for plaintiff Discovery Care's hypothetical dividend upon 
payment of $238,818.00 in premiums during that period. 
Omitted from this calculation, however, is the problem that fundamentally runs to the 
core as to why the Idaho Legislature repealed I.C. §72-915 the Discovery Care policy loses 
money, which requires, in essence, payment by other Idaho policyholders to cover Discovery 
Care's policy losses. For that period identified by Dairy Queen, Discovery Care paid 
$238,818.00 in premiums; however, it incurred $339,802.83 in policy losses. (R.356.) 
The policy rationale behind dividends is not to reward employers that incur more in 
claims than pay in premiums. In addition, the fundamental crux and purpose of the SIF policy-
payment of premium for coverage in amounts potentially in significant excess of that premium 
10 It is unclear where Dairy Queen derives this figure; it appears, however, th~t the figures are 
extracted in the Affidavit of Counsel that Dairy Queen moved to strike during summary 
judgment (R. 258-59.) The class period Dairy Queen actually claims is defined as "some or all 
ofthe Dividend Periods beginning on July 1,2002 and including all Dividend Periods ending on 
or before June 30, 2009[.]" (R. 29.) Dairy Queen's average does not include the 3.97% and 
4.45% figure for July I, 2002 to June 30, 2003 and July I, 2003 to June 30, 2004, respectively 
(R.258.) A 3.97% figure for a hypothetical policyholder paying $10,000.00 in the July 1,2002 
to June 30, 2003 period would yield a dividend of $397.00 - hardly an amount that would 
constitute a "substantial" impairment of a contract. 
11 Dairy Queen's use of a three-year period is also notable for the fact that it appears to deviate 
from the five-year period other plaintiffs contend is the applicable statute of limitations in 
actions regarding dividends. Farber et ai. v. The Idaho State Insurance Fund, Idaho Supreme 
Court Docket No. 38140 (pending). While not necessarily at issue on this appeal, SIF certainly 
contends that, as in the Farber action, a three-year statute of limitation is appropliate for claims 
under I.C §72-915, not a five-year. See Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 399 & 403-04. 
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- is not impacted by the repeal. Discovery Care can continue to run significant losses far and 
above its own paid premium, and, if a policy is in place that covers the claims, it will be 
provided coverage by the SIF. 
Finally, Dairy Queen's citation to City of Hayden, 108 Idaho 467, for the proposition 
that "a contract price adjustment of 5% could not be considered to be insubstantial" (as 
compared to Dairy Queen's unsubstantiated 7.6%) fails for a couple of reasons. First, Dairy 
Queen again ignores the reason for the insurance contracts. Second, Dairy Queen does not 
accurately reflect the Court's concerns in City of Hayden. What the Court correctly said was 
that: "We cannot say that the effect of a five percent price adjustment would be immaterial." 
108 Idaho at 468 (emphasis added). The Court's concern lay not with the 5% itself, but instead 
the need to petition for rate adjustment, administrative expenses of collecting and remitting the 
franchise fees, and the potential increase in the price of energy. Id. Dairy Queen suffers no 
such effect the repeal changes nothing, and Dairy Queen cannot demonstrate that it received 
and relied upon a dividend in the manner demanded in past years, such that it would suffer 
additional ill-effects of a change in the law. 
As such, given that the repeal of I.C. §72-915 does not have any impact on the purpose 
of the SIF's workers' compensation policies, and given that Dairy Queen cannot even contend 
that all policyholders are impacted by the change in the law (which some policyholders will, in 
fact, benefit from), Dairy Queen cannot demonstrate the repeal "substantially impaired" their 
contracts of insurance with the SIF. 
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3. Post-Threshold Inquiry: The State has a significant and legitimate public purpose 
behind the repeal ofLe. §72-915. 
Even if the threshold showing - a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship 
is met, the Court must then inquire "whether 'the State, in justification, [has] a significant and 
legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general 
social or economic problem,' to guarantee that 'the State is exercising its police power, rather 
than providing a benefit to special interests.'" RUI,371 F.3d at 1147. Thus, Diary Queen must 
demonstrate that there lacked a legitimate public purpose behind the repeal of I.C. §72-915. 
The legitimate public purpose behind the repeal of I.e. §72-915 is borne out by the 
Legislature's Statement of Purpose and Fiscal Note to S.B. 1 166a. (R. 245.) There, the 
Legislature stated the repeal was necessary to offset an adverse decision of the Idaho Supreme 
Court regarding the interpretation of I.e. §72-915, the need to clarify the law regarding the 
payment of dividends so that the SIF Manager could operate the SIF as an efficient insurance 
company, and to permit the SIF to pay dividends as its competitors do. (Id.) In turn, the 
repeal's Fiscal Note emphasized the financial uncertainly faced by SIF in light of the Court's 
ruling and the potential risks facing policyholders and the SIF as a result of the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of I.e. §72-915. (Id.) 
Critically, the very requirement of workers' compensation is, itself, an express exercise 
ofthc police power of the State: 
DECLARATION OF POLICE POWER. The common law system governing the 
remedy of workmen against employers for injuries received and occupational 
diseases contracted in industrial and public work is inconsistent with modern 
industrial conditions. The welfare of the state depends upon its industries and 
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even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of Idaho, therefore, 
exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the 
premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for 
injured workmen and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless 
of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or 
compensation, except as is otherwise provided in this act, and to that end all civil 
actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of 
the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as is in this 
law provided. 
I.C. §72-20l. In turn, the SIF was created "for the purpose of insuring employers against 
liability for compensation under this worker's compensation law ... and of securing to the 
persons entitled thereto the compensation provided by said laws." I.e. §72-901(1). The Board 
of the SIF is instructed to "direct the policies and operations of the state insurance fund to assure 
that [it] is run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound and maintains the 
public purposes for which [it) was created." I.e. §72-901(3) (emphasis added); Board of 
County Com'rs of Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 502, 
531 P.2d 588, 592 (1974) (stating that "no entity created by the state can engage in activities 
that do not have primarily a public, rather than a private purpose, nor can it finance or aid any 
such activity."). 
SIF's public purpose is also borne out in statutory operational aspects not imposed on 
private insurers. For example, public corporations are required to first attempt to insure through 
the SIF, unless declined as a matter of risk or if they opt to self-insure. I.C. §72-928(a); City of 
Boise v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Idaho 906, 935 P.2d 169 (1997). Additionally, the SIF is also 
statutorily required to administer workers' compensation claims for the Idaho National Guard, 
but is forbidden from collecting premiums or otherwise charging for such administration - in 
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effect, serving as the Idaho National Guard's third-party administrator for free. I.C §72-928(b). 
Finally, the SIF Board is comprised of individuals appointed by the Governor, two of whom are 
required to be sitting legislators. I.C §72-901(2). 
Thus, the significant and legitimate public purpose behind the repeal of I.C §72-915 is 
clear. The Farber ruling conflicted with years of dividend practices by the SIF and the "intent 
of the legislature to have the State Insurance Fund operate like an efficient insurance company 
subject to regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provision set forth in 
Title 41, Chapter 28, Idaho Code." (R. 245 (Statement of Purpose); accord, I.C §72-901(3) 
(stating "[iJt shall be the duty of the board of directors to direct the policies and operation of the 
state insurance fund to assure that the state insurance fund is run as an efficient insurance 
company, remains actuarially sound and maintains the public purposes for which the state 
insurance fund was created."). 
As a result, applying the new interpretation of I.C §72-915 from Farber "could subject 
the State Insurance Fund to pay dividends on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby 
restricting the Fund's ability to reduce premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders." 
(Id.) This is especially critical in light of the absence of the "safety net" for policyholders 
afforded by the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association, which SIF is forbidden from being a 
member of(LC §72-901(4»,12 as well as the potential risk of direct financial impact to public 
12 In brief, the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association (I.C §41-3601 et seq.) provides for 
payment of certain claims should a private insurer become insolvent. 
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coffers as stated in the repeal's Fiscal Note. (R. 245 - "that number could exceed $5,000,000 
annually. ") 
Further, the Farber interpretation of I.e. §72-915 would have required SIF to operate 
differently (and more inefficiently) than its competition, impairing its ability to compete, a point 
also emphasized by the Legislature. (R. 245, Statement of Purpose "This legislation will 
allow the State Insurance Fund to issue dividends in the same manner as other insurance 
companies operating within the State of Idaho.") 
In doing so, the Legislature made clear that its intent was to allow the SIF - the largest 
workers' compensation carrier in the State of Idaho - to be able to compete with private insurers 
that were not under the constraints of dividend requirements defined by the Farber court in 
analyzing I.e. §72-915. 13 Indeed, the policy underlying the grant of discretion to the SIF 
Manager to decline to issue dividends to policies that require loss payments exceeding billed 
premiums is appropriate, so as to avoid windfalls to policies that drain premium dollars from 
other Idaho policyholders. 1415 See, ~ S. CaL Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 
13 Certainly, in 1998, the Idaho Legislature intended to place the SIF on equal footing with 
private insurers: "Finally, in the 1998 amendments to the SIP's statutes, I.e. §72-90 1 (4) was 
added to make it clear the SIF is subject to, and must comply with, the provisions of the Idaho 
insurance code. That provision also states '[f]or purposes ofregulation, the state insurance fund 
shall be deemed to be a mutual insurer. '" Kelso, l34 Idaho at 134. 
14 Incredibly, Dairy Queen's counsel even acknowledged, at committee hearing on the repeal 
bill, that SIF could decline to pay dividends based on losses: "Senator Goedde inquired of Mr. 
Gordon whether he thought a policy holder that spends $150 on a premium and incurs $10,000 
in costs in that year because of an injured employee should receive a dividend. Mr. Gordon 
responded that it was his understanding that the SIF may consider losses and is not obligated to 
pay a dividend in that instance." (R. 188-89.) 
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895 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing that "if a statute causes unforeseen and unintended consequences 
such that private parties would obtain windfalls they never expected, later amendment to realign 
a statute with the parties' expected bargain may be reasonable.,,).16 Public policy clearly favors 
not rewarding employers that lose more than they pay, and further favors not issuing additional 
dividend payments for past years, which amounts are patently in excess of the dividends that 
SIF has previously detemlined to be "safely and properly divided." 
Thus, even if the repeal of I.e. §72-915 constituted a substantial impairment on the SIF 
policy with its policyholder, the Legislature had a legitimate public purpose behind the repeal, 
15 There would also obviously be a strong public policy discouraging the payment of dividends 
to employers that criminally endanger their employees. See,~ Dominguez v. Evergreen 
Resources, Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 10, 121 P .3d 938, 941 (2005)(injured worker's compensation 
claim benefits paid by State Insurance Fund; employer sentenced to 17 years on "federal 
charges of improper disposal of hazardous waste knowing that his actions placed others in 
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, as well as making material misstatements 
relating to a confined space entry pcrmit he falsely claimed was prepared prior to Dominguez 
entering the steel tank."). 
16 On reply, Dairy Queen may attempt to assert that S. Cal. requires burden-shifting; however, 
as explained in SIF's summary judgment reply briefing (R. 287-90), this does not occur in this 
action, as the State is not the contracting party, nor can Dairy Queen demonstrate a substantial 
impairment of contract. See, e.g., In re Seltzer, 104 F.3d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1996)( explaining 
that "[t]he burden is placed on the party asserting the benefit of the statute only when that party 
is the state. "). 
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as demonstrated by its Statement of Purpose, Fiscal Note, its statutory authority over the SIF, 
and its exercise of police power in the realm of workers' compensation insurance. 17 
4. Final Post-Threshold Inquiry: The adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of 
SIF and its policyholders, if any, is based upon reasonable conditions and is a 
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the repeal of I.e. §72-915. 
Again assuming arguendo that the Legislature caused a substantial impairment of a 
contractual right, not only is Diary Queen unable to show that the Legislature lacked a 
significant public purpose in repealing I.e. §72-915, they are unable to show that any 
adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties is not based upon 
reasonable conditions and is not of a character appropriate to the public purpose. This critically 
undercuts Dairy Queen's challenge because even were this Court to reach this stage of the 
analysis, Dairy Queen has failed to expressly indicate what is inappropriate as to the character 
of the repeal of I.C. §72-915, or to otherwise overcome the deference afforded the Legislature in 
making such repeal. See, ~ Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412-13 (holding that "[u]nless the 
State itself is a contracting party, ... '[a]s is customary in reviewing economic and social 
17 It is for these reasons that, even were this Court to diverge from the modem Contract Clause 
analysis, and instead apply some other unique test fashioned solely from Idaho law, as Dairy 
Queen demands, Idaho law obviously recognizes a police power/public welfare exception to the 
Contract Clause, as discussed above. See, ~ Agricultural Products Corp., 98 Idaho at 29 
("public interest"); City of Hayden, 108 Idaho at 469 ("police power regulations"); Bunker Hill 
Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 98 Idaho 249, 253, 561 P.2d 391, 395 (1977) ("police 
power" and "public interest"); CUff, 124 Idaho at 691 ("interest of public welfare") The very 
nature of Idaho's workers' compensation law, and the public purposes for which SIF serves, 
amply demonstrate that the retroactive repeal of I.e. §72-915 falls squarely within just such an 
exception. 
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regulation, ... courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and 
reasonableness of a particular measure. '). 
The repeal of I.e. §72-915 is a narrow repeal, only impacting a discretionary dividend 
that is merely incidental to the core function of SIF's policies. In addition, the repeal has no 
impact on the express terms of the policies, and the right to a dividend has not been abolished 
altogether. The law has merely been changed to conform with the methodology for calculating 
dividends that the Manager has used for years. 
Finally, any adjustment is of a character appropriate to the public purpose behind the 
repeaL As noted by the Legislature's Fiscal Note, the cost of reading the repeal as 
unconstitutional could drain upwards of $5,000,000 from the public coffers. By contrast, the 
Manager's current method of calculating dividends results in the SIF remaining competitive in 
the insurance environment and able to offer workers' compensation coverage to Idaho 
employers at the lowest premium rate. In short, Dairy Queen cannot show that any adjustment 
to the rights of the parties is not based upon reasonable conditions or that it is inappropriate to 
the character of the public purpose behind the repeaL 
G. The repeal was effective Mav 6, 2009, and the District Court's summary judgment 
ruling should be affirmed. 
In the District Court's Order of December 28, 2010 ("Order"), the District Court 
expressly ruled that "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is GRANTED in all respects[.r (R. 358.) SIP's summary judgment expressly 
argued that the emergency repeal was effective as of May 6, 2009, months before Dairy 
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Queen's action was initiated; as a result, and in conjunction with the retroactive nature of the 
repeal, Diary Queen's claims were ban'ed. (R. Adden., Item #2, pp. 15-17.) 
Dairy Queen expressly admits that the repeal bars claims arising after the repeal: "CDA 
Dairy Queen does not question the Legislature's power to repeal I.e. §72-915 prospectively (as 
to any contract entered into less than six months before the effective date of the repeal)." 
(Appellants' Brief at 3.) Nevertheless, Dairy Queen then asserts that the effective date of the 
appeal "was not directly raised for determination by District Court" (contrary to SIF's briefing, 
cited above), and was "mooted" by the District Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the 
retroacti ve effect of the repeal. (Appellants' Brief at 3, n.2.) 
To the contrary, it was addressed on summary judgment by SIF, both in briefing (R. 
Adden., Item #2, pp. 15-17) and at argument (Tr. 39:4-6.) The District Court offered no 
\ 
qualifiers in its ruling, oral or written, that the question of the effective date was "moot" as a 
result of the ruling on the constitution question. To the contrary, SIF's motion for summary 
judgment was granted "in all respects," to include the question of the effective date. 
Dairy Queen then obliquely argues in a footnote that "there appears to be no basis in fact 
or law to support the declaration of an emergency" (Appellants' Brief at 3, n.2), but disregards 
that the Legislature is afforded great discretion in declaring emergency legislation. This point 
was discussed at length by this Court in evaluating the propriety of the Legislature's emergency 
repeal of a law created by voter initiative. Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 140 Idaho 316, 320-21, 92 
P.3d 1063, 1067-68 (2002). In Gibbons, the Court stated it would not interfere with the 
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legislative process and that the Legislature's decision to declare an emergency is exclusively 
within the legislature's authority and will not be second-guessed by the judiciary. Id. 
Thus, this Court should reject Dairy Queen's attempt to divide the District Court's ruling 
for future piecemeal litigation and follow the precedent established in Gibbons to leave the 
validity of declaring an act an emergency to the legislature. 
H. Dairy Queen is not permitted to "reserve" issues on appeal nor conduct appeal-by-
ambush. 
Finally, in arguing that "[t]ederal decisional law ... is not relevant," (Appellants' Brief 
at 12), Dairy Queen states in a footnote that it does not intend to waive the right to present a 
number of arguments: 
CDA Dairy Queen does not intend to waive or to be seen as waiving the right to 
present these arguments which include in overview: a) the District Court 
completely misplaced reliance on National Railway v. Atchison Topeka, 470 U.S. 
451 (1985); b) the District Court erred in relying upon cases such as RUI One v. 
Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2004) without recognizing their lack of 
relevance to the retroactive changes made by SB 1 166aa; c) the District Court 
made a series of erroneous and unsupported factual determinations; and, d) the 
District Court relied upon its own erroneous factual determinations and 
unsupported and illogical claims made by the Idaho Legislature to incorrectly 
conclude that retroactive application of SB 1166aa was constitutional when 
evaluated using the analytical approach described in RUI One. 
(Appellants' Brief at 12, n.4.) No further argument or explanation is made on any of these 
points. However, in its "Issues Presented Upon Appeal," Dairy Queen only identifies the 
following issues, both related to the question of constitutionality under the Idaho Constitution: 
A. Is a retroactive change imposed by the Idaho Legislature upon a material 
term of contracts between, on the one hand, citizens of and businesses in Idaho 
and, on the other, an entity created by and overseen by the same Legislature a 
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violation of Art. I § 16 of the Idaho Constitution, which prohibits statc action 
which impairs the obligations of contracts? 
B. Docs federal decisional law relative to restrictions imposed on impairment of 
contracts by state action, as set out in Art. 1 §10 of the U.S. Constitution provide 
a relevant basis upon which a retroactive change imposed by the Idaho 
Legislature upon a material term of the contracts at issue in this matter can be 
rationally found to be permissible notwithstanding the prohibition against state 
action which impairs the obligations of contracts set out in Art. I § 16 of the 
Idaho Constitution? 
(Appellants' Brief at 10.) By rule, Appellants' Brief should fairly set forth all issues on appeal: 
Issues Presented on Appeal: A list of the issues presented on appeal, expressed 
in the tenns and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The 
statement of the issues should be short and concise, and should not be repetitious. 
The issues shall fairly state the issues presented for review. The statement of 
issues presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue fairly 
comprised therein. 
(LA.R. 35(a) (4». Neither of the cited issues address, nor fairly comprise, any contention that 
the District Court made erroneous factual determinations or errantly relied upon incorrect case 
law in analyzing the federal approach to the Contract Clause. Indeed, the remainder of 
Appellants' Brief is devoid of any identification of what facts were "erroneous and supported," 
and does not discuss or even mention RUI or National R.R. at any other place within 
Appellants' Brief, leaving this Court and SIF to only speculate as to what complaints Dairy 
Queen has on those items identified in the footnote. 
Dairy Queen's attempt to reserve argument on unidentified issues apparently until reply 
briefing or oral argument is not allowed. Rhead v. Hartford Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 446, 452, 19 
P.3d 760, 766 (2001)(holding, in review of summary judgment decision including free review 
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of district court's conclusions of law, that "[t]he Rheads failed to raise the issues of breach of 
contract and bad faith in their initial brief. The Court will not consider those issues."). 
This Court and the SIF should not be required to speculate as to the specific issues Dairy 
Queen intends to raise on appeal, nor should Dairy Queen be afforded the tactical advantage of 
an appeal-by-ambush by briefing several issues in reply briefing after making only the vaguest 
of reservations in its brief-in-chief. 
Accordingly, Dairy Queen has waived all issues not otherwise identified and argued in 
its brief-in-chief: including, in particular, any that may relate to the vab'Ue categories identified 
in Footnote 4 on page 12 of Appellants' Brief. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the December 28, 2010 decision of the District Court 
granting summary judgment to SIF, and, in turn, denying Dairy Queen's motion for partial 
summary judgment, should be affirmed. 
/}f1c/ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this p. ~ day of September, 2011. 
----
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